As far as the propriety of the remedial measures already ordered is concerned, we conclude that the judge was well within his powers in ordering a population limit or "cap" at the jail. See Perez v. Boston Hous. Many courts have held that population caps are particularly appropriate remedial measures in jail overcrowding cases.
Inmates v. Lanzaro, F. Idaho imposing population caps ; Libby v. Marshall, F. Malcolm, F. The rest of the judge's order also is appropriate and is narrowly tailored to his findings.
See DiMarzo v. We also agree with the plaintiffs, however, that further remedial measures may be necessary. The judge evidently was reluctant to order further remedies because of uncertainty concerning the extent of his powers, and it is clear that he could not, by himself, order special sessions.
We note that he did order that the sheriff was to "[w]ork with the courts. If he determines that the special sessions requested by the plaintiffs are the most appropriate remedial measures to bring the jail within compliance with the other aspects of his order, he should request. If necessary, the assistance of the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court should be sought. We will not order such special sessions without further consideration by the trial judge because he is in a better position than an appellate court to determine whether such sessions are appropriate at this time.
See Battle v. Anderson, F. Joinder of additional parties. Before trial, the sheriff filed a motion to compel joinder of additional defendants, including the Commissioner of Correction and the county commissioners of Middlesex County. See Mass. The plaintiffs assented to the motion, but the judge denied it. The sheriff contends that the judge erred in refusing to join these additional defendants. Rule 19 a provides for joinder of a party if "in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties.
The plaintiffs have not sought relief through expansion or renovation of the jail, nor did the trial judge grant any relief implicating the duties of the county commissioners. There was no error in refusing to join the county commissioners. The sheriff also argues that the Commissioner of Correction is a necessary party, because under the terms of the current remedial order, the sheriff is ordered to "[t]ransfer all inmates who may be transferred under the provision of M. Indeed, the Commissioner "has statutory responsibility over precisely the conditions giving rise to the violations.
We will not permit unconstitutional conditions to be perpetuated "out of an overly-nice solicitude for the division of powers and duties between county and state officials. Eisenstadt, F. We conclude, therefore, that for purposes of administering the current order and any further remedies that the trial judge shall order on remand, the Commissioner of Correction should be joined.
See Stock v. Massachusetts Hosp. School, Mass. The sheriff does not operate in a vacuum, and he has demonstrated that the Commissioner is in a position to thwart his compliance with the judge's order. See note 13, supra. Cahill, supra ruling that the Commissioner of Correction was a proper party defendant in an action concerning unconstitutional conditions at a county facility.
See also Benjamin v. Libby v. On remand to the trial judge, we order that the Commissioner of Correction be joined as a party defendant. The trial judge's judgment concerning liability of the sheriff is affirmed, as is the judge's order.
The case is remanded for consideration of such further remedies as now are needed. The Commissioner of Correction is to be joined as a party defendant. Each cubicle shall have a bed, desk, chair, and storage space for personal belongings.
In the dayroom and indoor exercise areas, there shall be wash basins available on a ratio of one wash basin for every eight 8 inmates or fraction thereof. Because the judge's conclusion that the detainees' due process rights were violated is adequate to support the relief ordered, we need not address these conclusions. Because this purported waiver occurred after entry of judgment, it is not properly before us, as plaintiffs' counsel observed during oral argument.
The waiver does not, of course, excuse the sheriff from compliance with the judge's order. Manson, supra, the court considered relevant the length of time during which inmates are exposed to conditions. The sheriff points to a statistic not in the record indicating that the average length of stay is sixteen days.
We do not consider this information, because it is not properly before us, although we note that an average length of stay is often a misleading statistic where there is a high turnover of "shorttimers" among detainees. If sixteen days is the average, many inmates may be incarcerated for longer periods.
See id. We also note that Mass. This time period is extended if a defendant requests a continuance. Certainly one year is a significant period of time in which to be exposed to genuine privation or hardship. In the reply brief, he contends that the use of floor mattresses was acceptable because of an "emergency. Because this argument is unsupported by the record, we do not address the question whether the use of floor mattresses is acceptable in emergency circumstances.
See Lock v. Jenkins, F. Thus, the sheriff has demonstrated that his good-faith efforts to comply with the trial judge's order have been frustrated by the Commissioner of Correction. Receive free daily summaries of new opinions from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Annotate this Case. The Supreme Judicial Court granted a request for direct appellate review. Richard M. Zielinski David B. Gartenberg with him for the plaintiffs. Richard L. Barry, Jr. Ellen M.
Dente with him for the defendant. In September, Page , for example, the population of the jail ranged from to inmates. From allowing inmates to be Page housed in or to sleep in the cells on the [ground floor] except for any purpose relating to the transportation of prisoners to and from the jail.
The judge also did not base his decision solely on the fact that regulations had been violated, Indeed, at oral argument, the plaintiffs' counsel conceded Page that the judge's order was not based solely on the regulations, because, as plaintiffs' counsel noted, the judge "did not order literal compliance with the regulations. Page Thompson, F. Wolfish have Page decided that double-bunking is, nonetheless, unconstitutional in some circumstances, particularly where the cells in which prisoners are double-bunked are very small, as were the cells in this case.
Having established that the conditions of confinement amounted to genuine privation and hardship, we turn to the question whether the conditions Page were "reasonably related to legitimate governmental objectives. He wrote in his memorandum of decision and report that "[h]aving doubts about the propriety of my order, and of its enforceability, Page and.
If he determines that the special sessions requested by the plaintiffs are the most appropriate remedial measures to bring the jail within compliance with the other aspects of his order, he should request Page that the Administrative Justice of the Superior Court institute such special sessions. So ordered.
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